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Abstract  
 
UN peacekeeping missions are complex social organizations, with soldiers coming from 
several countries.  In this environment, effective communication and interactions with 
local populations are often difficult, and establishing essential local support can be 
jeopardized when soldiers are culturally distant from local communities. At the same 
time, however, when local populations perceive peacekeepers as sufficiently distant or 
unbiased, the promotion of cooperation is enhanced. We explore whether cultural 
distance - in terms of geography, language and religion - and social distance – in terms 
of economy and institutions - between the peacekeepers and the local population 
improve the operational capabilities of a mission. We use monthly information on UN 
peacekeeping missions’ composition from 1990 to 2015. We find that higher geographic 
and cultural distances correspond to higher levels of violence against civilians and higher 
battle deaths, whereas institutional and economic differences have the opposite effects, 
although these are less robust.  
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Introduction  
 
The post-Cold War period has been marked by diverse array of external interventions in 
civil conflicts, in particular those sponsored by the United Nations under the banner of 
UN Peacekeeping Operations.  Since 1948, the UN has launched more than 70 operations, 
the majority of them after the end of the Cold War. Between 1989 and 1994 only, the 
Security Council authorized 20 new operations, increasing the number of peacekeepers 
from 11,000 to 75,000. The emergence of peacekeeping as the most important instrument 
of the international community to tackle civil wars is also evidenced by the sheer number 
of concurrent UN peacekeeping missions around the world today: as of December 2016, 
this number stood at 16, with almost 105,000 uniformed personnel. As part of this 
expansion, UN peacekeeping missions play a growing role in implementing, supervising 
and enforcing peace agreements in civil-war societies. The dramatic increase in the 
number of Blue Helmets is complemented by a parallel increase in the number of 
countries willing to provide peacekeepers: from 46 in 1990 to 120 in 2010 (Bove and 
Ruggeri, 2015) with the average number of countries contributing troops to a UN African 
peacekeeping missions surging from just eight in mid-1990s to twenty-one in the mid-
2000s.   
 
Large-N empirical studies have suggested that the net performance of UN peacekeeping 
may be effective for the recovery of war-torn societies, in particular by reducing the risk 
of conflict recurrence (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000), the risk of armed conflict in 
neighboring countries (Beardsley, 2011) and the likelihood of genocides (Melander, 2009), 
or by increasing peace duration after ceasefire (Fortna, 2004). Two recent contributions 
by Hultman et al. (2013, 2014) find the size of a UN mission can reduce the number of 
civilian casualties as well as the amount of battlefield deaths in African civil wars. They 
convincingly argue that additional forces are effective at separating and disarming the 
combatants, reducing the commitment problem between warring parties or shrinking the 
incentives for continued fighting. The protection of civilians and the reduction in 
battlefield violence are core objectives for peace operations in the last few decades. 
Therefore, the number of civilians and combatants’ casualties can be used as timely and 
tangible measure of the performance of a peace operation.  
 
In this article, however, we move beyond the recent debate on whether the presence or 
the size of a mission influence its success. Instead, we investigate how the relative 
composition of a U.N. mission vis-a-vis the local population can affect operational 
outcomes in the field. A recent contribution by Bove and Ruggeri (2015) explores the 
internal dimension of peacekeeping and finds that diversity in mission composition 
increases the ability to provide civilian protection. This is partly because the mission’s 
heterogeneity increases complementarity among donor countries by harnessing a 
portfolio of skills crucial to the mission. Concomitantly, composition diversity 
encourages a bottom-up and mutual monitoring where peacekeepers have disincentives 
to misconduct. In a similar vein, Haass and Ansorg (2016) find that when peace 
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operations include well-trained and well-equipped troops from advanced militaries, they 
are more likely to deter violence and monitor the implementation of peace agreements 
by affecting the costs of one-sided violence. However, it remains unclear whether the 
difference between Blue Helmets and local population can influence conflict resolution 
by decreasing the level of violence both between belligerents and against civilians. In fact, 
Bove and Ruggeri’s (2015) theoretical framework focuses on the internal composition of 
a mission, i.e., within the peacekeepers, whereas this article explores how interactions 
and distances between peacekeepers and peacekepts affect operational outcomes. This 
distinction entails distinctive causal mechanisms and very different expectations 
regarding the importance of composition in UN peacekeeping operations. Empirically, 
we do not operationalize the diversity of a mission per se, but we investigate the 
heterogeneity of a mission in relation to the local population. In fact, rather than using 
“classical” indexes of fractionalization or polarization, we operationalize   weighted 
cultural and social distances. In the rest of this paper, we use the terms distance and 
difference interchangeably. Moreover, we will distinguish between “cultural” and 
“social” distance. Cultural differences, i.e., in ideas, customs, and social behavior, are 
captured using geographic, linguistic and religious distance. In referring to social 
differences, we mean more specifically differences in economic and institutional 
characteristics and we use appropriate measures accordingly. 
 
Autesserre (2014a) has investigated the interactions and daily practices between Blue 
Helmets and local population —what we call the “horizontal dimension” of 
peacekeeping— and highlights that “all of the existing research on this topic is 
ethnographic and qualitative. As such, it presents little statistical evidence linking daily 
practice to peacebuilding outcomes. The work also tends to be very site specific. Thus, 
for many, it can appear anecdotal, overly personal or not rigorous enough, and lacking 
generalizability. Quantitative and experimental inquires could help to overcome these 
limitations by evaluating the strength and exportability of the qualitative findings 
(Autesserre, 2014a, p.495)”. We aim to fill this gap by providing the first large-N research 
on how the differences between peacekeepers and local population can influence the 
mission’s performance in terms of civilians’ protection and conflict resolution between 
belligerent parties.  
 
We claim that the composition of a mission - with regards to the countries of origin of 
peacekeepers -  can affect the operation along a horizontal dimension, which connects the 
mission to the local population and capture the interaction between the locals and the 
peacekeepers. We can anticipate mechanisms that generates both positive and negative 
effects, as the degree of similarity between military personal and the local population 
bears directly on quality of their interactions. Thus, we start by noting that a productive 
and trustworthy interaction with the local population is crucial as it provides 
peacekeepers with vital information about the situation on the ground which can 
improve operation efficacy in daily practice. At the same time, positive interactions with 
local communities can undermine support, and might stem the flow of resources for 
radical or insurgent groups. In aggregate, this will likely improve or aid in maintaining 
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security in strategically important environments. Thus, the importance of ensuring 
functional local interactions presents critical dilemmas : should the UN deploy troops 
with similar social and cultural backgrounds? What are the consequences of deploying 
peacekeepers from culturally and socially distant societies? 
 
On the one hand, lesser distances increase the odds that the Blue Helmets and local 
communities share norms, practices and languages. These shared characteristics might 
strengthen the trust between the locals and the mission. In turn, this bond might better 
facilitate sharing of information and ensure a sufficient level of local support. On the 
other hand, cultural proximity is a double-edge sword as it directly affects the likelihood 
that international actors are perceived as biased enforcers. In fact, and on average, 
missions composed of peacekeepers from faraway and diverse locations tends to signal 
neutrality on the part of the peacekeeping operation and even hints at higher resolve (i.e. 
wider buy-in and support) from the international community.  The alternative, where 
missions are composed of peacekeepers culturally or geographically proximal to the local 
population, may spurn perceptions that peacekeepers might be unable to credibly 
commit to enforcing violations by members of the favored group (be it the government 
or the rebels).  The net effect is unclear, prompting the empirical question at the heart of 
this article. 
 
Using monthly data on national personnel commitments to twenty-one operations 
around the globe, we compute the weighted distances between the peacekeeper force and 
the local population and study whether higher or lower distances, along geographic, 
linguistic, religious or institutional dimensions, correspond to higher or lower level of 
violence. We find that higher geographic and cultural distances correspond to higher 
levels of violence against civilians and higher battle-related deaths whereas institutional 
and economic differences reduce violence, in particular against civilians.  
 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a short 
analytical framework to understand how relations between the peacekeeping forces and 
local populations affects the mission’s capacity to protect civilians and stop belligerents’’ 
fighting. In section 3 we operationalize the concept of “distance” between the 
peacekeepers and the locals, and discuss the dataset as well as the empirical strategy. 
Section 4 presents our empirical results and section 5 offers our conclusions.  
 
Peacekeepers and the local population  
 
During a peacekeeping operation, the Blue Helmets interact, daily and locally, with a 
range of political and social actors, combatants and otherwise. This diversity of these 
interactions is missed traditionally in studies of the conflict literature (i.e. beyond the 
rebels and the government) to encompass a multitude of actors. In fact, peacekeepers 
primary interaction is with the local civilian population of the host state, and are 
frequently called upon to perform their duties within a non-military environment. These 
daily interactions and practices between UN peacekeepers and locals have been aptly 
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studied by qualitative research (e.g., Autesserre, 2014b), which identifies and explains 
how failures and tensions in the conflict resolution process are often triggered by daily 
practices and (mis)perception of them (see also Talentino, 2007).  Particularly important 
for this research, Autesserre (2014b) examines the everyday dimensions of peacebuilding 
and shows how interveners’ everyday practices and habits are important in explaining 
the effectiveness of a mission. There are many damaging ways of acting or thinking, such 
as an over-reliance on incomplete or misleading narratives, a lack of country-specific 
expertise and, even, a disregard of local knowledge. This approach can severely limit 
peacekeepers’ understanding of the dynamics on the ground. Moreover, foreign 
interveners often create boundaries between them and the host populations through 
dominant rituals e.g., by reinforcing a power disparity or perpetuating an imagine of 
moral superiority. These everyday elements create a distance between the two groups 
and in turn marginalize or antagonize local populations, generate resentment and 
encourage local stakeholders to resist international assistance. Therefore, the ties to the 
areas of deployment and the distance between peacekeepers and peacekepts is crucial for 
the success of the mission, yet the quantitative literature has substantially neglected this 
crucial aspect.  
 
The relationship between peacekeepers and local populations is shaped by a variety of 
factors, including individual and collective attitudes, which are influenced by cultural 
prejudices and varying knowledge of the host country’s population (Britt and Adler, 
2003). The issue of culture is not new in the study of peacekeeping, and several qualitative 
studies have emphasized how a broader cultural contextualization of peacekeeping is 
important for its outcome (see Rubinstein et al., 2008, for a review). The importance of a 
positive and stable relationship between a peacekeeping force and the local population is 
particularly vital for the success of the mission, and the special issue of International 
Peacekeeping, edited by Tomforde (2010), emphasizes how a correct understanding of 
local culture is a key component of any peacekeeping operation. Interestingly, however, 
most of these studies look towards improving civil-military coordination by identifying 
organizational cultural differences between military and civilian actors operating in the 
country at war, and usually in the context of NGOs. According to Hatzenbichler (2001) 
complex missions require a composite response and the very success in future 
deployments depends on whether military and civilian personnel cooperate in the field. 
Similarly, Oliker et al. (2004) report several tensions between military and civilian 
assistance providers of humanitarian reliefs in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2002, 
leading to the mission’s negative results, hence highlighting the importance of synergy 
between military and non-military components.   
 
Thus, peacekeepers ability to effectively interact with local communities is both essential 
to the mission outcome and comparatively under-explored in the literature. The 
Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations states that “all 
peace-keeping operation personnel must respect local laws and customs and maintain 
the highest standards of integrity in their personal conduct” (DPKO, 2003, p.58). While 
clearly in response to allegations regarding the conduct of UN personnel in peacekeeping 
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operations, this remark highlights the importance respect of local concerns and traditions 
plays in this relationship. Rubinstein et al. (2008, p. 545) calls for something akin to 
“travelers advice” which might take the form of a “list of facts about a group’s ways of 
dealing with the world, and a basic list of things a person engaging with them should or 
should not do”. Respecting cultural traditions and social mores is only part of the duty 
of an effective peacekeeper. As a recent report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping 
Operations (U.N., 2011, p.39) states, the “interaction of United Nations military, police 
and civilian personnel with the local population is necessary for the efficient and 
successful action of peacekeeping operations”. There are few qualitative studies on these 
interactions between peacekeepers and local populations, including Heiberg (1991) on 
UNIFIL in Lebanon and Pouligny (2006), who explores the many ways local populations 
perceive and respond to peacekeepers in their day-to-day engagements. Both studies 
suggest that the success in rebuilding war-torn societies lies in the appropriate interface 
with the civilian population.  
  
How does the diversity between peacekeepers and locals, what we label as “horizontal 
distance”, affect the success of an operation? There are at least two mechanisms at work: 
intelligence-gathering capabilities and local support. Clearly, both mechanisms fall 
within a rationalist explanation of war and, therefore, conflict resolution (Fearon, 1996). 
While the core emphasis here is on minimizing information asymmetry and resolving 
commitment problems, our article also aims to introduce the role of cultural and social 
distances to extend this rationalist framework. Although this is not meant to be an 
exhaustive list, we believe that the cultural and social dimensions are important and can 
influence the outcome or performance of the mission. Most of the mandates of 
peacekeeping operations in recent years encompass the protection of civilians and the 
reduction in battlefield violence. However, reducing hostilities in a war-torn country is a 
challenging task requiring several tools, such as trained and well-equipped troops, a 
sufficient level of resources from the international community, willingness to fulfill the 
mission’s mandate, and, perhaps more importantly, an accurate knowledge of the 
situation on the ground. This latter quality is near impossible without comprehensive 
intelligence-gathering capabilities.  
 
Information is crucial for two reasons: first, government and rebel leaders often lack 
information about their relative strength (see e.g., Ruggeri et al., 2013). Providing 
information about their weapons, personnel and strategies, their position and level of 
determination, the political climate, or even just about the relative probability of different 
outcomes, helps to mitigate the issue of asymmetric information, which has often been 
put forward by several scholars as explaining bargaining failures (see e.g., Jackson and 
Morelli, 2011, for a review). Peacekeeping forces need to correctly identify armed groups, 
their structure, capabilities, behaviors and goals for effective information sharing. 
Peacekeeping forces must also understand the boundaries between groups and of the 
existing hierarchies within each group, as UNSOM in Somalia clearly demonstrated 
(Sahnoun, 1994). Second, peacekeeping forces need relevant and substantial information 
about local dynamics to accomplish their tasks, particularly in addressing immediate 
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threats when the appropriate early warning systems can prevent violence. Only through 
engagement with the local population, including individuals in remote areas, can Blue 
Helmets estimate the range of threats that civilians face, their vulnerability to those 
threats, and any self-protection measure that they may have in place.  
 
Building trust among the local population can reduce peacekeepers’ exposure to attacks 
by armed groups. According to an exhaustive report by the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO, 1999), a dearth of local support not only hinders the 
capacity of the operation to implement its mandate and conduct its daily activities, but 
can also increase physical danger for the mission’s personnel.3 According to Howard’s 
(2008) writing of the UNTAET mission in Timor-Lest, which is generally regarded as a 
successful mission, the peacekeeping forces engaged well and appropriately with the East 
Timorese. “The leadership judged that the best way to defeat the militia groups was to 
make sure that the local population would not provide the groups with support 
(Howard, 2008, p.286)”. The UN missions in Liberia has also engaged in “hearts and 
minds” activities such as small-scale food distributions, to improve the level of 
engagement with local communities (Thakur et al., 2007).  
 
Hence, the literature presents convincing arguments for why positive interpersonal 
interactions between foreign peacekeepers and the local population can improve mission 
capacity and more effectively achieve its objectives.  Our second question, though, is how 
to achieve constructive and fruitful relations. All else being equal, should the UN deploy 
peacekeeping troops from culturally or socially similar countries? 
 
Cultural and social distance and operational capabilities of a mission 
 
The daily work and practices of peacekeepers is constrained by social and cultural 
barriers between the mission’s forces and the local population. The presence of cultural, 
social and economic differences between peacekeepers and host populations can create a 
visible barrier and discourage cooperation.  Haddad (2010) examines the importance of 
cultural awareness in the French military doctrine and how intercultural skills are used 
by the French military in their daily life during UNIFIL II in Lebanon. Autesserre recalls 
how a Pakistani intervener working in Somalia “resented the countless barriers that 
Somali people placed against the possible integration of interveners. By expecting female 
expatriates to wear the hijab and by making virtually no efforts to compromise on their 
strict cultural and religious requirements, his Somali contacts prevented the formation of 
productive relationships with their international counterparts. In contrast, having fewer 
cultural and socioeconomic differences between the two groups diminishes the divide 
between them, as I observed in Cyprus and Israel, and as is reportedly the case in 
Colombia” (Autesserre, 2014b: 181).   
 
                                               
3 By one estimate, between 1948 and 2007 the UN has suffered a total of 2,400 fatalities of uniformed and 
civilian peacekeepers (Centre for International Cooperation, 2008).  
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Moreover, regional interveners are more likely to come from countries facing similar 
challenges. Although nationality is the most consistent or obvious divide between 
peacekeepers and peacekepts, divisions can also run along linguistic, religious or 
institutional lines, and can prevent the level of cooperation necessary to achieve the 
mission’s goal. Languages constitute significant barriers between outsiders and the local 
population, as “peacebuilders deployed in conflict zones usually speak, at most, one of 
the official languages of the country, but they very rarely know the local dialects” 
(Autesserre, 2014b, p.175). In fact, Autesserre (2014b) recalls how only 100 of the 1700 UN 
police deployed in Haiti in 2005 spoke French or Creole, and how the UN mission in 
Congo had to wait ten years to assign translators to the peacekeeping contingents.   
 
As a result, we might expect far-flung countries should be less capable of developing 
trustworthy ties with locals than regional interveners because the former are more likely 
to lack local knowledge. However, trustworthiness depends on several issues, and more 
than knowledge of the surroundings. Recent research pointed outs how impartiality, and 
importantly the perception of impartiality, can aid third party interveners to push 
belligerents from violent strategies to non-violent bargaining (Wallensteen, 2011).4 When 
local populations perceive an international peacekeeper as biased in favor of a specific 
group, they are less likely to trust them. In fact, there is plenty of evidence suggesting 
that biased mediators – those having links or shares preferences with one of the 
antagonists – are less credible trust-builders. Kydd’s (2006) theoretical model, for 
example, convincingly shows how mediators that are biased toward one side will be 
ineffective. 5  Rauchhaus’s (2006) model and quantitative analysis also indicate that 
mediation that targets asymmetric information is a highly effective form of conflict 
management and that impartial mediators generally outperform biased ones. In a similar 
vein, Favretto (2009) finds that peace is a more likely outcome when a third parties are 
unbiased because they can seek agreements that both adversaries find 
acceptable.  Similarly, Beber (2012) argues that mediation by biased third parties is 
relatively ineffective because they cannot credibly convey private, conflict-relevant 
information that they hold.  
 
In theory, the diversity of countries and cultures in a peacekeeping operation, and their 
distance from the host country is thought to preserve impartiality of peacekeepers. 
Regional peacekeepers, in contrast, quite possibly have a history of relations with local 
groups which might increase the likelihood they will favor one domestic group over the 
others. Moreover, neighboring countries are more likely to have an history of conflictual 
                                               
4 Note that the “impartiality” and ‘‘neutrality’’ are often used as substitutes in the literature, when they 
actually have different meanings.  We use unbiasedness or impartiality to indicate a lack of alignment 
with one party. As the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operation recalls, “United Nations 
peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the 
execution of their mandate”. See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/principles.shtml 
5 He also identifies which kind of unbiasedness is helpful (moderate ideal points) and which harmful 
(indifference to the issue). 
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behavior. Although borders per se do not cause wars, they create structure of risks and 
opportunities in which different types of interactions can be more (or less) likely to occur 
(see Starr and Most, 1978). In a similar vein, Vasquez (1993, 307) claims that territorial 
contiguity is the “source of conflict most likely to result in war”. States that share borders 
are likely to have greater numbers of interaction opportunities. At the same time, there is 
a higher perceived risk of being attacked by neighbors than by distant countries. Distance 
also affects force projection capabilities. Thus, by changing threat perception and the 
willingness and opportunities for interactions, geographic proximity can increase the 
chances of interstate conflict. As bordering states face greater uncertainty in their 
relations than more distant states, troops from more proximate locations are more likely 
to carry with them greater historical rivalry.6 
 
The concept of neutrality is very important for the composition and the cultural balance 
of the troops deployed. On the one hand, including peacekeepers with vested interested 
in the conflict or former “enemies” from neighboring regions can jeopardize the 
cooperation of the local parties. On the other hand, being perceived as impartial eases the 
peacekeepers’ relationships with the local communities by reducing distrust and 
improves the chances of acceptance cooperation. This, in turn, affects the amount and 
reliability of information that peacekeepers can gather from the local populations about 
the battlefield and improves their capability of working effectively with the locals.   In 
summary, relationship building, smooth communication and trustworthiness are 
contributing factors to the success of a peacekeeping initiative.  These factors are shaped 
in a non-obvious way by the differences and cultural barriers between peacekeepers and 
local communities. To address this gap in peacekeeping literature, we consider the 
composition of a peacekeeping force, i.e., the nationality of its donor countries, and its 
cultural and social distance from the host population.  
 
In Table 1, we summarize some of the above-mentioned mechanisms that could improve 
the operational capabilities of a peacekeeping mission. It should be recalled that the effect 
of high cultural and social distance is not necessarily unidirectional and can improve or 
worsen mission capacity to protect civilians and reduce battle death.  In the top-left panel 
we highlight an important trade-off between cultural similarity and neutrality: whereas 
high cultural distance could increase the perception of impartiality and neutrality, thus 
improving trust-building, it also reduces the chances of having troops with the right 
portfolio of intercultural skills that might be crucial to the mission. At the same time, an 
operational contingent with high levels of language proximity to the locals should reduce 
barriers and facilitate effective communication and interactions with local communities.  
 
Another possible pattern is conditional upon the level of “institutional” and “economic” 
distance, that we label under the term “social distance”.  On the one hand, high social 
distance can imply the presence of contingents from countries with very different 
economies and institutions. This condition should improve cooperation and, in turn, 
                                               
6 We thank an anonymous reviewer for highlighting this.  
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reduce the level of hostilities because the UN signals resolve and commitment. In fact, in 
this scenario, local actors tend to cooperate more frequently given the risk of facing higher 
costs as the UN is heavily investing in the mission. On the contrary, high social distances 
could affect negatively the mission performance given the social deafness of the Blue 
Helmets (see Duffey 2000).  On the other hand, low social distances could signal a biased 
intervention. This might result in deteriorating levels of trust and local support, and, 
absent other conditions, higher levels of violence against civilians and between 
combatants.  However, peacekeepers coming from a country with similar economic and 
institutional features could have higher social empathy and, in turn, the mission could 
benefit from a low social distance. Of the many ways to operationalize cultural and social 
distance, we consider a battery of proxies of the differences in social practices, values, 
norms, economies and institutions. This is the issue considered next.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Data and Empirical Strategy  
 
As a starting point, we need to construct a measure of the distance between the 
peacekeepers and the host society. This is constructed as follows: assume that a mission 
in a host country m (e.g., UNISOM in Somalia) is composed of donor countries n = 1...N. 
Denote by !"# the share of peacekepers from a country n in host country m, and by $"# 
the cultural distance between populations n and m. The weighted cultural or social 
distance between countries n and m is then:  
 WCD() = 	∑ (./01  π() 	× 	d()) 
 
In other words, for every single mission we sum up the dyadic distance between each 
contributor to the operation and the host country, weighted by the proportion of 
peacekeepers belonging to each donor country. We expect the ability to gain and foster 
the trust of local populations to be a function of the weighted cultural (or social) distance 
between the peacekeeper force and the local population. To capture possible differences 
between countries most effectively, we include an array of indexes. We first use 
information on direct contiguity relationships between countries from the Correlated of 
War dataset,7 measures of linguistic and religious distances (see Spolaore and Wacziarg, 
2016) and our own indexes of economic, political and institutional distance.  
 
First, we look at whether peacekeepers come from neighboring countries to crudely 
characterize long-term cultural and historical proximity and therefore interactions across 
populations. Although this measure is straightforward, quantifying culture requires the 
comparison of diverse markers of identity and this measure may conceal the complex 
amalgam of customs, values, beliefs and social organizations. Therefore, we complement 
it with a number of additional distances. 
                                               
7 Correlates of War. Direct Contiguity Data, 1816-2006. Version 3.1. Online: http://correlatesofwar.org. 
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Second, we use an index of linguistic distance based on language trees (Fearon, 2003). In 
this index, languages are grouped into families based on similarities between them and 
it is therefore based on a discrete number of common nodes. We rely on Spolaore and 
Wacziarg’s (2016) to rank these distances ranging from 0 to 1, correcting with weighted 
values where sub-populations within each country are taken into account.  
 
Third, we use a measure of religious distance also taken also from Spolaore and Wacziarg  
(2016). They base their indexes on the work of Mecham et al. (2006) on the prevalence of 
religion in each country. They calculate the number of common nodes between the 
dominant religions of each country in a pair and implement a simple transformation to 
obtain measures of religious distance bounded by 0 and 1. Religion has always played a 
central role in social and economic issues, and religious affiliations can affect the degree 
of cohesion within societies. We therefore use weighted distances accounting for the 
share of each religious sub-group within included countries8.  
 
Fourth, we build our own measures of economic and institutional distance. Specifically, 
we aim to capture the extent to which countries are similar in terms of economic 
development. To construct this index, we take the absolute difference in per capita GDP, 
and divide this difference by the highest value of per capita GDP in the sample. In this 
way, the index can potentially achieve any value between 0 and 1. Similarly, we build 
indexes of institutional distance using the polity score.9  Figure 1 shows the correlation 
between our proxies of diversity distances. Although generally positive, the strength of 
the correlation is either weak or moderate, and the highest value, 0.6, is between religious 
and linguistic distance.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
In Figure 2, using the UN peacekeeping missions in Angola and Burundi as example, we 
show that the variation of our different distances — in this case language and 
institutions— is not only between countries but has also a substantial within variation. 
The decomposition of the standard deviation of our distances into between and within 
variation also shows that distances vary between missions as well as over time within the 
mission.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
We evaluate peacekeeping operations according to two variables: the number of civilians 
killed each month (i.e., the one-sided violence against civilians) and the number of 
                                               
8 We cannot use data on ethnicity, such as the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) by Vogt et al. (2015) to gauge 
horizontal diversity, because the dataset measures within countries ethnic relations rather than between 
countries features. Hence, the absence of a dyadic data structure does not allow use to use this innovative 
dataset.  
9 http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2015.pdf 
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battlefield deaths produced by a government-rebel group dyad each month. Data one-
sided violence against civilians are collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP) and we take monthly events from the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset 
(GED). The monthly number of battlefield deaths includes government soldiers and rebel 
fighters, as well as civilians and unknown victims killed in the crossfire by battle-related 
violence, and are also featured in the UCDP GED Dataset (see Sundberg and Melander, 
2013, for a description of the dataset). Ultimately, our analysis covers a maximum of 
twenty-one UN peacekeeping missions in civil wars from 1991 to 2015.10  
 
The empirical specification we employ builds on the recent work of Hultman et al. (2013, 
2014) and we a similar set of control variables, depending on whether the outcome 
variable —our measure of the operational performance— is civilian protection (i.e., 
Hultman et al., 2013) or a reduction in the level of battlefield violence (i.e., Hultman et al., 
2014). Our main explanatory variable, the weighted distance between the peacekeeping 
force and the host country population, is constructed using the last version of the IPI 
Peacekeeping Database, with monthly information on which countries have sent their 
UN peacekeepers where in the post–Cold War period and what kind of uniformed 
personnel they chose to deploy (see Perry and Smith, 2013). When more than one mission 
in each country is present, we take the sum of all uniformed personnel. The actors on the 
ground do not differentiate between missions and their mandates and when there are 
multiple missions their bases are usually close enough. Moreover, when there are 
multiple missions, the main operation is usually much larger than the other(s) and makes 
their contribution negligible.  True, our mechanical procedure may lead to some 
mistakes, but we do not have information on whether the type of interactions with local 
actors differ across missions.  Our procedure is arguably better than opening the door to 
subjective coding. Our results do not significantly change when we consider only the 
largest operation in each country. 
 
We include the lagged dependent variables to account for temporal dependence and 
temporal correlation in violence. We also include a cubic polynomial time trend to ensure 
that we explicitly model any residual temporal dependence (Carter and Signorino, 2010). 
All the remaining control variables are lagged one month (with the exception of 
population, which varies every year) to mitigate issues of reverse causality. We control 
for the total number of armed troops because increasing numbers of military personnel 
reduces violence. We also include the total number of police units as well as the number 
of observers deployed (see Hultman et al. 2013, 2014, for a discussion). We control for the 
host country population as the number of casualties is affected by the size of the host 
society.  To make sure that our results are not driven by the heterogeneity in the 
nationality of the contributing countries, and to further mitigate the issue of selection 
bias, we add the monthly number of donor countries. Moreover, to deal with the 
                                               
10 Due to missing values for some of our covariates, we focus on UN missions in Angola, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Democratic Republic of Congo, El Salvador, Eritrea, 
Georgia, Haiti, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Liberia, Mali, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan.   
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possibility of bias stemming from omitted variables we estimate panels with mission-
country fixed effects.  
 
Note that the issue of non-random assignment could be unpacked into two aspects:  
whether peacekeepers are sent to specific types of conflict, often the difficult cases (see 
e.g., Fortna, 2004); and if the characteristics of the mission depends on specific conflict 
characteristics. The first type of selection bias does not directly concern our analysis as 
we are interested in comparing patterns of violence between different peacekeeping 
missions rather than between different conflicts with and without the presence of 
peacekeeping. To address the second issue, we explicitly control for same of the most 
salient features of a mission, namely mandate and size.  Yet, it is possible that the average 
distance between peacekeepers and locals, i.e., its composition, partially depends on 
some of the conflict characteristics. We use fixed-effects models, we include cubic 
polynomials and we control for a host of other confounding factors, such as the number 
of donor countries, which should partially mitigate this source of endogeneity. That being 
said, we still cannot rule out the possibility that other time-varying unobservable co-
determinants of mission composition and violence - not explicitly controlled for – exist. 
In this case, our estimate will be biased, yet the direction of the bias is difficult to 
determine a priori.  
 
Note that our approach is very conservative and our empirical strategy likely soaks up 
the effects of “slow-moving” control variables in either the country fixed effects or in the 
cubic polynomials. Given the nature of the dependent variables –the number of civilians 
or combatants killed - we need a count model, as standard linear regression can produce 
inefficient, inconsistent and biased estimates. Moreover, the over-dispersion of the 
dependent variables suggests the use of a negative binomial model. Finally, we control 
for group-wise heteroscedasticity and serial correlation by reporting robust standard 
errors clustered on country-mission.  
 
Empirical results 
 
Table 2 shows our result when one-sided violence is the dependent variable, whereas in 
Table 3 the dependent variable is battlefield violence. We start our discussion by briefly 
summarizing the results with regard to the control variables.11 The results are broadly 
consistent with Hultman et al. (2013, 2014), although there are two important differences: 
on the one hand, they only consider UN missions in sub-Saharan Africa whereas we use 
a larger sample; on the other hand, however, we restrict our analysis to cases when UN 
peace operations are deployed, otherwise we would not be able to compute distances 
between peacekeepers and locals.   
 
                                               
11 The control variables, except the number of donors and time trends, are expressed in thousands to 
improve readability of results.  
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As we can see in Tables 2 and 3, the size of the peacekeeping mission, measured by the 
number of boots on the ground, is negative and significant, as one would expect. The 
number of donor countries is also negative, suggesting that more diverse operations are 
better at protecting the civilians and reducing battlefield violence, as Bove and Ruggeri 
(2016) find. The number of police officers and observers corresponds to larger number of 
causalities, although the latter is often insignificant. The size of the population is positive, 
as are the lagged value of battlefield violence and the lagged indicator for one-sided 
violence in the previous month. Finally, there seems to be a U-shaped relation between 
the duration of the mission and the number of combatant and non-combatant casualties 
echoing Ruggeri et al (2013) on decline of local support to operations after a collaborative 
peak, as evidenced by the cubic polynomial.  
 
Table 2 builds on the baseline model in Hultman et al. (2013), but adds a control variable 
for the number of countries contributing to the operation. We keep this important 
covariate in the other models.  In model (i) we introduce our first explanatory variable, a 
weighted index of contiguity, which is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Therefore, missions with many peacekeepers from neighboring countries (e.g., the 
mission in Mali in 2014, with peacekeepers from Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Niger and Guinea) are correlated with higher numbers of civilian victims.  In 
model (ii) we control for linguistic distance, which is positive and significant at similar 
levels.  In model (iii) we include the religious distance between the peacekeepers and the 
host country’s local population, which is also significant at conventional levels and 
positively signed. Note that as countries are fragmented into a multitude of linguistic and 
religious groups, the weighted version of linguistic and religious distance provides a 
more refined measure of cultural distance between countries. In fact, we are explicitly 
taking into account the relative weight that each group has in relation to the others within 
each country.12 Therefore, it seems that when the mission on average is more distant 
linguistically and in terms of religion to the locals, there are higher levels of civilians’ 
victimization. 
  
We then include our institutional and economic distances. In model (iv) we check 
whether our GDP index, where higher values translate to higher GPD per capita diversity 
between locals and peacekeepers, affects one-sided violence.  In model (v) we use an 
index of political regime diversity, based on the Polity scale, where the higher our index, 
the larger the weighted difference in level of democracy between locals and countries 
contributing to the UN peacekeeping mission. Both indexes are negative and statistically 
significant. Given that the average countries suffering civil war have usually low per-
capita income and negative values on the Polity scale, taken together this last round of 
estimates would suggest that the greater the number of peacekeepers from democratic 
and richer countries, the lower is the levels of civilian victimization.  
 
                                               
12 The “un-weighted” version of the above distances produce qualitatively similar results.  
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Finally, models (iv) to (ix) of Table 2 replicate models (ii)-(v) but simultaneously control 
for contiguity. In fact, it is important to check whether cultural, economic and 
institutional distances have an independent effect on mission performances. As we can 
see, our previous results hold up well under this important additional scrutiny. 
 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
 
In Table A1, in our Online Appendix, we perform two important robustness checks: first, 
we note that our sample has two important outliers, Rwanda and Democratic Republic 
of Congo, with extremely high levels of civilian casualties and violence more generally. 
We further test the robustness of our findings by replicating Table 2 and excluding these 
countries and results are consistent with previous findings. Second, given the 
assumptions that need to be met in fixed effects negative binomial models (see 
Guimaraes, 2008), we simple negative binomial models without country fixed effects (see 
Table A2, Online Appendix). These models still account for the many zeros and for some 
extreme observations in the right tail of the distribution of the dependent variable and, 
by and large, the results carry over.  We omit tables due to space limitations, although all 
additional models can be found in the Appendix and can be produced with our 
replication material.     
 
In Figure 3, we provide graphical representations for the marginal effects of different 
distances on one-sided violence. Based on the estimates of our negative binomial 
regression, Table 2A, we simulate the effects of diversity on monthly civilians’ 
victimization using Clarify (King, Tomz, Wittenberg 2000).  The y-axis report the 
expected count of monthly  OSV  during a  UN mission and the x-axis the percentile (from 
the lowest to the highest ) of the diversity proxy.13 In the top-left quadrant, we report the 
effect of linguistic distance. Moving from the lowest percentile to the 25th leads to an 
increase of 25 in the expected count of OSV per month.  After that point, we observe 
decreasing marginal returns. In the top-right panel, we report the expected count of OSV 
at different percentiles of religious distance between Blue Helmets and locals. Moving 
from the 10th to the 75th percentile increases OSV from 4 to 42  civilians killed per month. 
The effects of regime distance, bottom-right panel, does not seem to have substantial 
effects on the level of civilians’ victimization. On the contrary, in the bottom-right panel, 
we report the important effects of GDP distance on civilians’ victimization. If we move 
from the 10th to 75th percentile, hence increasing the economic distance between Blue 
Helmets and locals, we observe a decrease in the level of violence from 47 to 9 civilians 
killed every month. 
  
                                               
13 We report the values at the percentiles in order to account for the variables’ distribution and avoid 
simulation based on non-existing values of the variables. We report the marginal effect of all our weighted 
distances with the exception of contiguity, as contiguity can be conceptualize as a weighted percentage of 
Blue Helmets coming from contiguous  countries rather than the contributors’ distance.   
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Figure 3 about here 
 
 
To explore our second measure of mission’s performance —the level of battlefield 
violence— models in Table 3 borrow from the baseline model in Hultman et al. (2014). 
Overall, Table 3 mirrors the main results of Table 2:   missions with peacekeepers from 
non-contiguous states seem to be more capable of reducing belligerent hostilities relative 
to those with peacekeepers from neighboring counties. At the same time, missions 
characterized by higher linguistic and religious distances with the local populations are 
associated with higher levels of violence. Moving from geographic and cultural 
differences to institutional and economic disparities, however, there are two notable 
exceptions. Although distance in per capita GDP is still negative, it is insignificant at 
conventional levels.  Moreover, the distance in the Polity score is now positive and 
significant. Hence, higher number of troops from “institutionally similar” countries” are 
associated with lower odds that the belligerents lay down their weapons. The other 
measures of distance all continue to add significantly to the fit of the model in the same 
positive direction.   Interestingly, controlling simultaneously for geographic proximity 
does not affect our main results.   
 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
We then perform the same robustness exercises in Tables A3 and A4, both in our Online 
Appendix, by excluding Rwanda and DRC and by estimating models without fixed 
effects. We find that geographic proximity, linguistic and religious distances, as well as 
differences in the GDP are all positive and statistically different from zero.  We can 
conclude from these two tables that the previous findings are strongly borne out by this 
new set of empirical results. 
 
Although our baseline equations control for a large set of confounding factors, and 
includes time trends, country fixed effects, and lagged values of our variables of interest, 
Table A5 in our Online Appendix tries to further alleviate concerns of selection bias. We 
run a battery of regressions of distances on battlefield deaths and one-sided violence and 
use a simple two-way OLS model with fixed effects and time trends. As we can see, none 
of our measures of distance are affected by our main outcome variables, except the Polity 
distance. The negative relation between one-sided violence and the Polity distance is 
consistent with results in Table 2, thus partially undermining our findings. Yet, battle 
deaths have also a negative relation with this index, which runs counter to our results in 
Table 3. If anything, this suggest that we are underestimating the effect of institutional 
distance on battlefield violence.   
 
To sum up, we find that the composition of an operation vis-à-vis local populations 
matters and affects the performance of a UN mission. In particular, three basic results 
emerge: i) UN missions with peacekeepers from neighboring countries  are associated 
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with more violence perpetrated against civilians and higher level of battlefield violence; 
ii) higher cultural distances between the peacekeepers and the locals, populations, 
weighted by the shares of sub-populations within each country, are positively correlated 
with the number of civilian and combatant casualties; iii) there is a negative relation 
between economic and institutional distance and civilian protection, and higher 
development and institutional differences between the Blue Helmets and the locals seem 
to decrease civilian victimization.   
  
Figure 4 about here 
 
In Figure 4 we report the graphical representation of the effects of distances on monthly 
battle related deaths.  In the top-left panel, we show how linguistic distance affects the 
violence between belligerents.  Moving from the lowest 5th percentile of linguistic 
distance between locals and peacekeepers to its median level, we see that the monthly 
count of battle deaths moves from 31 to 72. Religious distance also appears to have a 
substantial effect, top-right panel. In fact, an increase of religious diversity from the 5th 
percentile to the 75th means a quite large increase of conflict violence from 11 to 109 
monthly battle related deaths. However, both institutional and economic distances do 
not seem to have meaningful effects. Polity distance seems to have substantive effects 
only at very high percentiles and, moreover, its confidence intervals are very large.  The 
effect of economic distance is more substantive, although the curve is almost flat, thus 
showing little variation.    
 
 Conclusions 
 
This article extends what Fortna and Howard (2008) define as the “the second wave of 
peacekeeping research”. We investigate a frequently neglected issue in the quantitative 
study of peacekeeping, the importance of mission composition, in particular the way it 
affects the relationship between the local population and the peacekeepers. We contribute 
to our understanding of how composition matters by exploring whether and how 
peacekeepers’ distances with respect to locals can impact the peacekeeping’s operational 
performance. As Autesserre (2014a) recently stressed, the study of distances and the 
effects of these distance on daily interactions between Blue Helmets and locals, is vital to 
properly understand peacekeeping outcomes. This article is evidence that quantitative 
investigations are an important aspect of developing possible generalizations on the role 
of diversity between Blue Helmets and local population.  
 
In fact, reliable and precise intelligence, proper understanding of local conditions, as well 
as a sufficient level of popular support, have always been considered vital ingredients for 
peace operation success. As continuous interaction with local populations and resistance 
groups is the primary mode of gathering valuable information for the mission, 
information flows or any type of substantive support stemming from the locals would be 
severely constrained if locals do not trust the peacekeepers.  
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However, it remains unclear how the cultural proximity between the Blue Helmets and 
the locals can affect the success of the mission. Lower distances might imply the existence 
of shared norms, practices and languages, and these qualities might simplify day-to-day 
interactions. Cultural proximity might also affect the perception of impartiality and 
unbiasedness of the Blue Helmets. We focused on the weighted distance between the 
peacekeeping force and the host country’s population, which is expected to influence the 
quality of the peacekeepers-locals interaction, and in turn the mission’s performances. 
We operationalize the connection between the peacekeepers and the host population 
using a variety of markers for cultural distances, including linguistic, religious, economic 
and institutional differences.  
 
Our results show that cultural proximity increases the level of protection of civilians and 
reduces the number of battlefield casualties, two tangible markers for peacekeeping 
mission success. Therefore, optimizing peacekeeping deployments at lower levels of 
cultural distance seems to be beneficial in terms of mission performance. Militaries and 
UN have started to re-shaped their training and practice to ensure all deployed personnel 
are aware of, and sensitive to, the cultures in which their operations are undertaken. 
Moreover, the development of peacekeeping training centers specifically focuses on 
deploying troops to places with a reduced cultural distance. For example, the UN is 
particularly keen for Indonesia to deploy Muslim forces to peace operations within 
Muslim countries. Including cultural elements in training protocols prior to 
peacekeeping deployment seems to be even more appropriate in light of our empirical 
results. Training in cultural awareness should be treated as a mission priority and 
strategic investment rather than a budgeted cost. 
  
At the same time, however, we find that including non-neighboring donor countries in a 
UN mission has positive effects on both operational outcomes. Moreover, distances in 
economic development and democracy are associated to enhanced operational capacities 
for civilian protection. These last two results might be explained because such 
arrangements lead to higher levels of trust and stronger assumptions of impartiality from 
the local population.  However, economic and institutional effects seem to be less stable 
compared to linguist and religious distance and the importance of their effects depends 
on the outcome we study.  
Some important avenues for further research might emerge from our work. Although we 
provide a general interpretation of cultural, social and economic distance in terms of 
barriers to the creation of trust and perception of neutrality, we remain largely agnostic 
about the prevalence of specific mechanisms of peacekeeping capacity. We cannot also 
state firmly the exact traits and characteristics that create these barriers. Moreover, a 
further disaggregation of actors and actions would be particularly important for more 
detailed policy prescriptions. Our analyses consider violence against civilians by both 
governments and rebels but there are important differences related to who is perpetrating 
the violence. A better understanding of how and why governments rather than rebel 
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groups decide to directly target civilians will identify conditions under which the effects 
of peacekeepers’ distance from the locals is stronger or weaker. Future work could also 
integrate new outcome variables that are crucial for understanding the interactions 
between peacekeepers and local actors, for example whether the local actors use violence 
against peacekeepers. Violence against peacekeepers can severely jeopardize the purpose 
of a mission, making interactions with the local population more difficult. These patterns 
of violence often lock mission resources to force protection protocols, reducing the 
likelihood and effectiveness of humanitarian services. In a similar vein, an additional 
dimension of peacekeeping practices can be captured by looking at peacekeepers’ 
misconduct against the local population. These wrongdoings can severely hinder 
productive and trustworthy interactions with the local population and, by extension, the 
mission’s success. Because of the limited number of empirical works on what we call “the 
horizontal dimension of peacekeeping”, and perhaps a new “organizational turn” in the 
study of peace operations, and the lack of consensus on several underlying mechanisms, 
there is certainly a crowded agenda for future research in this area.  
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FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Correlation Matrix between different indexes of distance 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Variation of Diversity Indexes within mission – Angola and Burundi 
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Figure 3: Monthly Expected One-Sided Violence count over several distances  
 
Figure 4: Monthly Expected Battle-related Deaths count over several distances  
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Table 1: Empirical Expectations and Mechanisms  
 
 High Low 
 Advantages Disadvantages Advantages Disadvantages 
Cultural 
Distance 
Perception of 
impartiality or 
neutrality 
Lack of local 
knowledge 
 
Communication 
and coordination 
problems 
 
Cultural 
awareness  
 
Effective 
communication 
and coordination 
 
Biased 
intervention 
 
Social 
Distance 
Resolve 
 
Perception of 
impartiality or 
neutrality  
Social Deafness 
 
Lack of 
social/economic 
empathy 
Social Status 
Empathy 
Lack of 
commitment   
 
Biased 
intervention   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Distance with Locals and One-sided Violence - fixed effects negative binomial 
 i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix 
Civilian Casualties         
All OSV (t-1) 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005* 0.004 0.003 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
UN Troops (t-1) -0.054*** -0.063*** -0.056*** -0.079*** -0.053*** -0.048*** -0.043*** -0.077*** -0.052*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
UN Police (t-1) 0.397*** 0.421*** 0.473*** 0.512*** 0.425*** 0.258*** 0.310*** 0.456*** 0.368*** 
 (0.059) (0.064) (0.064) (0.059) (0.063) (0.068) (0.068) (0.061) (0.067) 
UN Observers (t-1) 0.482 0.351 0.141 1.527*** 0.138 0.077 -0.063 1.530*** 0.106 
 (0.364) (0.375) (0.382) (0.380) (0.399) (0.371) (0.376) (0.382) (0.399) 
Number Donor 
Countries -0.031
*** -0.022*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.027*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Population 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
t -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.031*** -0.038*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.027*** -0.034*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
t2 0.000** 0.000* 0.000 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
t3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Contiguity (t-1) 2.963***     5.774*** 5.709*** 2.809*** 2.588** 
 (0.677)     (0.933) (0.855) (0.728) (1.084) 
Linguistic D. (t-1)  7.020***    7.594***    
  (1.759)    (1.849)    
Religious D. (t-1)   3.567***    4.032***   
   (0.728)    (0.759)   
Polity D.(t-1)    -0.686**    -0.668**  
    (0.284)    (0.290)  
GDP D. (t-1)     -8.048***    -7.034*** 
     (1.492)    (1.534) 
Observations 1793 1776 1776 1583 1557 1770 1770 1568 1548 
Panel with Fixed Effects. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by country 
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 3: Distance with Locals and Battle-deaths - fixed effects negative binomial 
 i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix 
Battle Deaths          
All Battle Deaths (t-1) 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
UN Troops (t-1) -0.010 -0.013 -0.003 -0.043*** -0.005 -0.008 0.004 -0.040*** -0.007 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
UN Police (t-1) 0.210*** 0.277*** 0.306*** 0.449*** 0.270*** 0.142** 0.166*** 0.366*** 0.183*** 
 (0.053) (0.057) (0.057) (0.051) (0.056) (0.060) (0.059) (0.052) (0.058) 
UN Observers (t-1) -0.365 -0.738** -1.024*** 0.906*** -0.887** -0.611* -0.938*** 1.073*** -0.690* 
 (0.328) (0.333) (0.337) (0.339) (0.368) (0.335) (0.337) (0.343) (0.368) 
Number Donor Countries -0.034*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Population 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
t -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.036*** -0.028*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.032*** -0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
t2 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000* -0.000 -0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
t3 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Contiguity (t-1) 3.615***     4.744*** 5.091*** 4.287*** 3.910*** 
 (0.540)     (0.632) (0.612) (0.533) (0.708) 
Linguistic D. (t-1)  6.983***    7.911***    
  (1.294)    (1.426)    
Religious D. (t-1)   3.178***    3.755***   
   (0.531)    (0.558)   
Polity D.(t-1)    0.519**    0.682***  
    (0.220)    (0.227)  
GDP D. (t-1)     -0.833    0.739 
     (0.951)    (0.971) 
Observations 1924 1907 1907 1714 1671 1901 1901 1699 1662 
Panel with Fixed Effects. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by country 
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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In this appendix, we report a variety of additional model specifications to increase the confidence in our arguments and to 
show that the findings do not depend on specific decisions in the research design.    
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Table A1: Distance with Locals and One-sided Violence - fixed effects negative binomial, no DRC and Rwanda 
 i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix 
Civilian Casualties         
All OSV (t-1) 0.698*** 0.707*** 0.714*** 0.568*** 0.545*** 0.687*** 0.705*** 0.550*** 0.527*** 
 (0.165) (0.164) (0.167) (0.181) (0.176) (0.167) (0.169) (0.184) (0.177) 
UN Troops (t-1) 0.010 0.016 0.041*** -0.020 0.041** 0.019 0.046*** -0.020 0.045*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.017) 
UN Police (t-1) 0.289*** 0.251*** 0.198*** 0.364*** 0.224*** 0.191*** 0.136* 0.357*** 0.235*** 
 (0.064) (0.070) (0.070) (0.068) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071) (0.069) (0.071) 
UN Observers (t-1) 0.451 0.189 0.095 1.495*** -0.267 0.032 -0.072 1.578*** -0.212 
 (0.397) (0.410) (0.422) (0.409) (0.476) (0.415) (0.424) (0.416) (0.484) 
Number Donor Countries -0.055*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.048*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Population 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
t -0.045*** -0.042*** -0.035*** -0.045*** -0.062*** -0.039*** -0.033*** -0.042*** -0.062*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
t2 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
t3 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Contiguity (t-1) 2.005**     4.903*** 4.161*** 1.486 -2.140 
 (0.892)     (1.179) (1.012) (1.042) (1.438) 
Linguistic D. (t-1)  6.836***    8.682***    
  (2.229)    (2.418)    
Religious D. (t-1)   6.246***    6.567***   
   (0.878)    (0.898)   
Polity D.(t-1)    -0.921***    -0.906***  
    (0.312)    (0.327)  
GDP D. (t-1)     -6.316***    -6.994*** 
     (1.473)    (1.573) 
Observations 1594 1577 1577 1384 1358 1571 1571 1369 1349 
Panel with Fixed Effects. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by country. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A2: Distance with Locals and One-sided Violence - negative binomial 
 i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix 
Civilian Casualties          
All OSV (t-1) 0.016* 0.017* 0.014* 0.014* 0.013** 0.017* 0.014* 0.014* 0.013** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) 
UN Troops (t-1) -0.177*** -0.190*** -0.115** -0.164*** -0.121** -0.189*** -0.115** -0.162*** -0.129** 
 (0.038) (0.041) (0.048) (0.041) (0.053) (0.041) (0.048) (0.042) (0.054) 
UN Police (t-1) -0.102 0.114 0.230 0.008 -0.212 0.078 0.279 -0.048 -0.196 
 (0.427) (0.251) (0.203) (0.258) (0.274) (0.305) (0.279) (0.364) (0.430) 
UN Observers (t-1) 9.681*** 9.443*** 6.100* 9.510*** 7.651** 9.475*** 6.046* 9.691*** 8.010** 
 (2.953) (2.863) (3.173) (2.720) (3.153) (2.893) (3.128) (2.866) (3.334) 
Number Donor Countries -0.042* -0.041* -0.045** -0.046* -0.038 -0.041* -0.045** -0.051** -0.039 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) 
Population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
t -0.087** -0.101** -0.074** -0.086*** -0.101** -0.101** -0.074** -0.081** -0.098** 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.033) (0.032) (0.045) (0.041) (0.033) (0.035) (0.048) 
t2 0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.000* 0.001 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
t3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Contiguity (t-1) 2.176     0.898 -1.283 1.250 0.165 
 (4.492)     (2.473) (2.722) (3.514) (5.285) 
Linguistic D. (t-1)  9.873***    9.814***    
  (2.721)    (2.689)    
Religious D. (t-1)   10.621***    10.718***   
   (2.482)    (2.550)   
Polity D.(t-1)    -1.259    -1.689  
    (2.334)    (2.221)  
GDP D. (t-1)     -22.167***    -20.726*** 
     (4.960)    (4.722) 
Observations 2052 1996 1996 1846 1863 1990 1990 1788 1805 
Pooled estimation. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by country. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A3: Distance with Locals and Battle-deaths - fixed effects negative binomial, no DRC and Rwanda 
 i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix 
Battle Deaths          
All Battle Deaths (t-1) 0.186*** 0.225*** 0.173*** 0.308*** 0.239*** 0.233*** 0.180*** 0.318*** 0.234*** 
 (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.060) (0.056) (0.050) (0.050) (0.061) (0.056) 
UN Troops (t-1) 0.021** 0.023** 0.045*** 0.000 0.045*** 0.023** 0.049*** 0.001 0.043*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) 
UN Police (t-1) 0.146*** 0.181*** 0.134** 0.272*** 0.119** 0.118* 0.056 0.258*** 0.101* 
 (0.054) (0.059) (0.057) (0.055) (0.058) (0.061) (0.059) (0.056) (0.059) 
UN Observers (t-1) -0.156 -0.489 -0.631* 0.925*** -0.716* -0.414 -0.683** 0.974*** -0.645 
 (0.327) (0.336) (0.341) (0.320) (0.400) (0.345) (0.341) (0.327) (0.403) 
Number Donor Countries -0.047*** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.046*** -0.047*** -0.045*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Population 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
t -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.020*** -0.040*** -0.037*** -0.022*** -0.017*** -0.038*** -0.034*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
t2 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
t3 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Contiguity (t-1) 2.801***     4.190*** 4.209*** 3.001*** 1.699* 
 (0.658)     (0.747) (0.706) (0.728) (0.892) 
Linguistic D. (t-1)  7.474***    9.039***    
  (1.470)    (1.669)    
Religious D. (t-1)   5.303***    5.785***   
   (0.615)    (0.636)   
Polity D.(t-1)    0.272    0.494**  
    (0.236)    (0.251)  
GDP D. (t-1)     -0.563    0.192 
     (0.900)    (0.963) 
Observations 1725 1708 1708 1515 1472 1702 1702 1500 1463 
Panel with Fixed Effects. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by country. *p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A4: Distance with Locals and Battle-deaths - negative binomial 
 i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix 
Battle Deaths          
All Battle Deaths (t-1) 0.024 0.026 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.026 0.018 0.018 0.020 
 (0.037) (0.052) (0.018) (0.017) (0.028) (0.054) (0.019) (0.015) (0.024) 
UN Troops (t-1) -0.091*** -0.102*** -0.041 -0.099*** -0.093 -0.096*** -0.041 -0.087*** -0.112* 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.041) (0.033) (0.060) (0.037) (0.041) (0.033) (0.059) 
UN Police (t-1) -0.232 0.138 0.182 0.140 -0.112 -0.054 0.047 -0.102 -0.284 
 (0.533) (0.323) (0.263) (0.294) (0.413) (0.430) (0.354) (0.424) (0.657) 
UN Observers (t-1) 7.089*** 6.419*** 3.718 7.071*** 7.034** 6.562** 4.039 7.526*** 8.405** 
 (2.661) (2.421) (2.285) (2.356) (3.339) (2.623) (2.485) (2.593) (3.697) 
Number Donor Countries -0.077*** -0.080*** -0.074*** -0.065*** -0.051** -0.083*** -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.060** 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) 
Population 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
t -0.067* -0.071** -0.057** -0.070** -0.093** -0.072** -0.056** -0.063** -0.079* 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.025) (0.028) (0.039) (0.035) (0.026) (0.031) (0.046) 
t2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
t3 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Contiguity (t-1) 6.583     4.893 3.510 5.388 5.953 
 (7.070)     (4.487) (3.627) (4.389) (10.943) 
Linguistic D. (t-1)  7.118***    6.786**    
  (2.514)    (2.791)    
Religious D. (t-1)   8.984***    8.613***   
   (1.802)    (1.973)   
Polity D.(t-1)    1.331    0.469  
    (2.073)    (1.806)  
GDP D. (t-1)     -7.996    -4.999 
     (5.996)    (5.143) 
Observations 2052 1996 1996 1846 1863 1990 1990 1788 1805 
Pooled estimation. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by country.*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A5: Conflict characteristics and distance with locals - fixed effects OLS 
 
 Contiguity Linguistic Religious Polity GDP Contiguity Linguistic Religious Polity GDP 
UN Troops 
(t-1) -0.042 -0.019 -0.016 0.076 0.097 -0.042 -0.019 -0.016 0.076 0.097 
 (0.050) (0.081) (0.193) (0.260) (0.076) (0.050) (0.081) (0.192) (0.260) (0.076) 
UN Police (t-
1) -0.110 -0.270 -0.758 2.948 -0.279 -0.110 -0.270 -0.758 2.949 -0.279 
 (0.614) (0.353) (0.769) (3.650) (0.375) (0.614) (0.353) (0.769) (3.649) (0.375) 
UN 
Observers (t-
1) 
3.523** 1.530 -8.330 3.063 -1.569 3.524** 1.527 -8.331 3.038 -1.569 
 (1.303) (3.165) (7.550) (11.917) (4.176) (1.304) (3.167) (7.550) (11.910) (4.178) 
Number 
Donor 
Countries 
0.053* -0.068 -0.053 0.033 0.082** 0.053* -0.068 -0.053 0.033 0.082** 
 (0.027) (0.046) (0.096) (0.166) (0.034) (0.027) (0.046) (0.096) (0.166) (0.034) 
Population 0.000 0.000 0.001* -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001* -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
All OSV (t-
1) 0.001 -0.007 -0.006 -0.039
*** 0.000      
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.007)      
All Battle 
Deaths (t-1)      0.001 -0.007 -0.005 -0.044
*** 0.000 
      (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.007) 
Observations 2053 1997 1997 1848 1866 2053 1997 1997 1848 1866 
Distances multiplied by 100 to facilitate interpretation. 
Two-way fixed-effect models. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses clustered by country 
*p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
 
 
